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Abstract:   
We focus on understanding the role of productivity in determining wage structure 
differences between men and women in academia. The data arise from a pay-equity study 
carried out in a single Midwestern U.S. university over the 1996-7 academic year. 
Econometric results confirm that external market forces exert influence over both male 
and female salary. But peer review ratings play a significant role in male but not female 
earnings determination, with similar results for objective measures of research, teaching 

















The paper contributes to the growing literature on wage determination within 
academia and on the roles of individual productivity and external market salaries as a 
proxy for market forces. The data arise from an internally sponsored pay-equity study 
carried out in a single Midwestern U.S. university over the 1996-7 academic year. The 
institutional data set has undergone extensive cleaning in cooperation with the faculty 
records office of the university. This ensures less measurement error and more accurate 
measures of productivity than in a typical study.  Our focus is upon understanding the 
role of productivity in determining wage structure and salary differences between men 
and women in these specific academic environs.  
The data provide a rich array of standard human capital variables in addition to an 
external market salary measure and two complementary measures of academic 
productivity: peer review ratings and a set of objective measures of research output, grant 
funding, teaching and service awards. The external market salary data are matched to 
individual faculty by rank and discipline. This connects the university under study to the 
marketplace and allows us to assess the extent to which academic pay at the university in 
question is primarily driven by market forces. Given the idiosyncratic nature of 
disciplines, comparison of academic productivity is inherently challenging. Peer review 
may solve, in part, the problem of across-discipline comparisons but is intrinsically 
subjective; the measures of research output are objective but assume feasibility of across-
discipline comparisons.   
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We use traditional human capital based Mincer (1974) earnings regressions to 
examine the role of academic productivity in explaining gender differences in wage 
structure at the university in question. To our knowledge the current study is the first to 
incorporate such a wide variety of individual productivity measures including peer-
review and external market salary on a U.S. sample across a broad set of academic 
disciplines. It allows us to gauge the full range of possible productivity impacts on 
academic salary by gender. We find that external market salary has a strong and 
significant effect on both male and female salary determination. In contrast the 
complementary objective productivity measures and peer review tend to be significant 
determinants of male but not female salary. 
 The main advantage of our data set, apart from including detailed personnel 
information about a broad set of faculty across disciplines, is that the data includes, for a 
large subset of the sample, subjective peer reviews of productivity and, for a smaller 
subset, various objective (but not quality-adjusted)  indicators of productivity (articles, 
books, grants, service and teaching awards). The data has the disadvantage that it is a 
single cross-section and is from a single university.  Can our results be extrapolated to the 
US academic market generally? The university in question has conducted gender equity 
pay reviews on an occasional basis, is in good standing with the American Association of 
University Professors (AAUP), has not had any discrimination cases go to court and 
views itself as a progressive institution of higher education in these regards.  It seems 
reasonable to view this university as a typical American research university and apply the 
lessons learned here to the U.S. academic labor market. The period considered, 1996-97, 
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while not as recent as one might like, is quite comparable to the period examined by the 
studies noted below, which include data spanning 1968 to 2001.  
 
2. Previous Literature: Academic Salary by Gender 
 Before examining the empirical literature, consider the following explanations for 
the existence of gender pay differentials advanced in the absence of productivity 
differences. Milgrom and Oster’s (1987) invisibility hypothesis suggests there is an 
incentive for employers to hide able but ‘invisible’ employees, such as women and 
minorities, from other potential employers. Promotion leads to greater visibility and 
hence higher risk of outside offers. Valian (1998) introduces the notion of a gender 
schema, similar to a stereotype, involving the adoption of unconscious hypotheses about 
males and females. Valian reports a 1991 experiment by Biernat, Manis, and Nelson in 
which evaluators systematically over-estimate (under-estimate) height of males (females) 
to fit their preconceived notions. Another experiment shows that when the number of 
female applicants for a managerial job is low, they are evaluated by male and female 
MBA students as being less qualified.  Ex ante perceptions of greater male productivity 
may become self-fulfilling in salary structure. Bjerk (2008) models a dynamic version of 
a standard signaling game. Workers from two groups have differing opportunities to 
signal higher-level productivity while in entry-level jobs and the skill-signals of women 
are evaluated less precisely by male managers than those of their male colleagues. The 
dynamic aspect of the model ensures that firms eventually learn about the skills of their 
employees. But the delay in female recognition and promotion contributes to the glass 
ceiling/sticky floor phenomenon and, presumably, in the interim, a lack of reward for 
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productivity.  Finally, modern models of monopsony emphasize an upward sloping labor 
supply curve due to search frictions and dynamic effects. [See Manning (2003) and 
Ashenfelter et al (2010)]  If females are less mobile, males will receive and more easily 
exploit external wage offers.  
Alternatively, salary differences by gender may be due largely to productivity 
differences. In an innovative study of Israeli private sector firms Hellerstein and 
Neumark (1999) conclude that once productivity is properly measured, gender 
differences explain the majority of the industry gender wage differential. Clearly the 
measurement of academic productivity within a given field of academia, never mind 
across fields, is a challenge. But a number of studies of the academic labor market have 
taken up this challenge.1 
 
Studies with a broad set of disciplines  
Barbezat (1991) examines national surveys of U.S. faculty taken between 1968 and 1989. 
The first three of these (1960’s and 1970’s) predate the large influx of women into the 
professorial ranks. Barbezat reports that the number of articles published has a significant 
positive effect on salary for males but that is true for women only after a threshold of four 
has been attained. Up to four books published are significant positive factors for both 
male and female salaries but publishing additional books benefits only males, pointing to 
possible differences in the more senior ranks. 
Lindley et al (1992) examine salary gain among University of Alabama faculty in 
the U.S.A. from 1981 to 1985, finding that books and exhibition/performances have a 
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positive but insignificant effect overall and that in general refereed articles have a 
significant positive effect; there is no significant difference by gender.  
Ginther and Hayes (1999, 2003) examine a sample of U.S. faculty in the 
humanities using, due to data limitations, an average annual rate of productivity, 
assuming a constant publication stream over the career. They find that articles, books, 
and chapters in books are significant positive determinants of salary for female academics 
but only the latter two are significant or sizable for males. The humanities comprise 
several similar disciplines; whether these results easily generalize to a broader set of 
disciplines is an open question. 
Euwals and Ward (2005) look at a broader set of disciplines at five Scottish 
universities from 1994-95 to 1995-96, finding that research publications, grants, self-
reported teaching quality, and time out of the profession are all important determinants of 
salary. A gender dummy variable is included and found to be insignificant. Because the 
salary scales for all ranks below professor are set through a nationally negotiated fixed 
salary structure it is unclear if the results apply to other contexts. 
The study across disciplines that is most comparable to ours is the Binder et al 
[2010] study that, like ours considers a single U.S. university. They focus on objective 
measures of teaching and research (but not service); their study not only considers 
quantity of articles produced but introduces quality via the Journal Citation Report 
Impact Factor; no quality adjustment is provided for books. They have no overall 
measure of productivity.Cumulative course preps and number of current graduate 
students are significant for both sexes. Articles in the last five years (cumulative grant 
dollars) are significant (weakly significant) in male but not female earnings regressions, 
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and books in the last five years and article citation impact in the last five years are 
significant for the earnings of women but not men.   
   
Single discipline studies  
Ginther and Kahn (2004) analyze two small U.S. longitudinal data sets on economists 
between 1988-89 and 1972-2001. They are able to apply a quality adjustment to the 
publication measures. This is an advantage of analyzing a single field, partially offset by 
worries about how representative the study is and the correspondingly small sample size. 
They find that female economists are less likely than males to be granted academic 
tenure, with part of this promotions gap apparently due to lower measured productivity. 
However, in one of their samples they find that women with children are just as 
productive as men but are less likely to receive tenure. If productive women are not 
promoted as quickly as productive men, the salary return to productivity will likewise be 
lower for women. This is akin to our finding of a surprising lack of correlation between 
productivity and salary for female academics while productivity measures are strongly 
related to male academic salaries.  
Finally Blackaby et al (2005) consider the market for economists in the United 
Kingdom, based on a survey conducted in 1999. This study is an advance over most 
others in that it has access to a tight research quality measure. They assign a quality grade 
to the top 3 (self-nominated) refereed publications over the career, based on an 
independent, published assessment of journal quality arising from the Research 
Assessment Exercise in Britain. Their specification for earnings involves a male dummy 
and extensive controls; they affirm that the research productivity measure is a significant, 
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positive factor in salaries as is research grant success but that, despite these controls, 
women’s salaries still lag behind men’s. Unfortunately, sample size precludes separate 
analysis by gender. Hence their analysis is silent on whether women and men receive the 
same boost from academic publication.2 Their study is also noteworthy for including a 
market variable, the number of outside offers received, which was found to be a 
significant contributor to gender salary differentials among British academic economists. 
 
Findings overall  
From these studies we conclude that published articles, in general, have a significant 
positive impact on salary except possibly for males in the humanities, and a similar 
pattern for books at least when broad disciplinary samples are examined. There is one 
study suggesting that articles can be important for women but only if well cited. Grants 
and teaching quality make a positive contribution to salaries overall in Scotland; teaching 
is important in the US but grant research is only significant for males. None of the studies 
reported on service measures and none had a measure of overall productivity. In sum, 
from these studies, the gender differences in the salary effect of objective productivity 
measures appear to be relatively small. 
 
3. Data 
The current study utilizes data collected as part of a pay equity study at a large 
public, urban university in the United States for the 1996-97 academic year.  The pay 
equity study was requested by the university’s Commission on Women and mandated by 
the university administration. The study collected data on salaries of all faculty on the 
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main and regional campuses together with a standard set of controls and human capital 
variables. Male annual faculty salaries were about 22 percent higher, on average, than 
those of their female counterparts.  
The university includes the usual arts and science disciplines, as well as numerous 
professional schools including allied health, business, dentistry, education, engineering, 
fine arts, journalism, law, library, medicine, music, nursing, physical education, public 
affairs and social work.  The Pay Equity Task Force requested information relating to 
market salaries and productivity. A market reference was obtained by matching all 
faculty members by rank and discipline, undifferentiated by gender, with national or 
regional salary factors.3 Peer rating reviews of faculty were also solicited, with senior 
academics (who had not been involved in determining salaries) reviewing their discipline 
specific colleagues. Departments were allowed to opt out of this additional process and, 
as a result, peer productivity review scores are not available for all faculty. Subsequently 
a request was made to faculty to provide c.v.’s, on a voluntary basis, so that an objective 
count of items such as publications, teaching, and service awards could be made.4 Hence 
there are three separate samples used for the analysis in this paper: (i) the sample of all 
faculty; (ii) the sample of all faculty with peer productivity review scores; and (iii) the 
sample of all faculty with objective measures of productivity. 
We exclude all faculty with administrative appointments at the dean level and 
above, as well as librarians, scientists and clinical supervisors of medical students (due to 
the difficulty in separating clinical income from university compensation). The sample of 
851 regular faculty members includes 574 males and 277 females. Descriptive statistics 
by gender for this sample are included in Table 1. The subsample with peer review data 
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[Place Table 1 about here.] 
includes 418 males and 207 females, 625 faculty in total; the subsample with objective 
counts includes 169 males and 115 females, 284 faculty in all. We have both peer 
reviews and objective counts for 251 of these faculty. 
The key variable in the study is the contractual monthly salary without fringe 
benefits. Because some faculty are on academic year contracts and others are on calendar 
year contracts, the annual salary is converted to a monthly salary by applying the 
appropriate divisor. 
 The mean logarithm of the monthly salary is 8.426 for female faculty relative to 
8.622 for male faculty; equating to $4,564 per month for women versus $5,552 per month 
for men.5 The wage difference is just under $1,000 per month, or about 22 percent of the 
average female faculty salary. 
While salary differences by gender may be due to productivity differences, the 
measurement of academic productivity within a given field, much less across fields, is 
difficult. However our unusually rich data enable us to make some headway on this 
critical issue.6 The key variables are discussed in turn, starting with the more novel 
features. 
 
Peer Review  
The peer review was requested as part of a gender pay equity study conducted under the 
auspices of the university’s Commission on Women. Reviewers were experienced faculty 
members who had not been directly involved in salary setting roles.7 These reviews did 
not feed directly into the salary setting process within the unit but reviewers understood 
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they would feed into a campus-level process for identifying cases in need of salary 
remediation.8 Each department was asked to identify, where feasible, at least five senior 
raters who had not directly participated in salary setting determinations.  To avoid 
divisive discussion and comparison, each rater was asked to privately rate all colleagues 
on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being poor and 5 outstanding. No one self-rated. The ratings 
were to be based upon research, service and teaching, with equal weights applied in the 
absence of a written policy indicating otherwise.  Each faculty member who was rated 
had several rating scores; these were averaged and rounded to the nearest integer. Only 
these integers are in the current data set.  Those rated as 4-5 are assigned to the High 
peer- review; those with a 3 are assigned to the Medium peer-review; those with a 1-2 
rating are assigned to the Low peer-review which is the reference case in the statistical 
analysis.9     
This peer-review, discipline-specific exercise is advantageous as it functions 
across disciplines and schools with differing standards.  The publication of a peer 
reviewed article may be much more important in one discipline than another; the relative 
weighting of research, service and teaching may also vary across discipline. Raters may 
take these differences into consideration.  Disadvantages of peer-review include potential 
subjectivity and the need to obtain the cooperation of all disciplines in a rather sensitive 
process. Participation in the exercise was encouraged but not mandated by central 
administration.  As a result there are productivity ratings for a subset of 625 of our 
original sample of 851 faculty, i.e. approximately three-quarters of the initial sample.  
In general the sub-sample with peer review ratings is similar to the full sample 
except that those with remote appointments are substantially under-represented.  There 
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are some differences in the peer-review sample by gender.  Table 1 shows a greater 
percentage of males in the High rated group and a lower percentage in the Medium.  The 
percentage in the Low rated group is almost identical across gender.  This suggests a 
potential for peer ratings to help explain the lower salaries for female academics. 
 The peer review rating process was implemented solely for this pay equity study. 
How does review by peers factor into the ordinary salary review process? The main 
channels for increasing faculty salaries are: matching an outside offer, promotion to a 
higher rank, taking on a substantial administrative task, and annual increments. The role 
of review by peers is variable across these channels. The largest salary adjustments are 
probably for matching outside salary offers. These would be handled administratively for 
the most part although with reference to past annual reviews which include faculty input.  
Each year every faculty member files an annual report that is the basis for an annual 
review. The next largest increments are for promotion which is based upon review by 
peers. The process for assigning individual annual salary increments varies widely both 
across schools and within schools across departments. Increment assignment is based on 
the annual review process but that may be performed by a faculty committee or the 
department chair or by a combination. The role of review by peers in these assignments 
apparently varies from dominant to minimal.10 Hence salaries may diverge over time 
from peer-reviewed perceptions of productivity. 
 
Counts of Publications, Grant Dollars, Service and Teaching Awards  
As a supplement to peer-review ratings, the university also conducted a count of the 
number of books and refereed articles published, as well as teaching and service awards 
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and grant funding received.  The relationship between peer ratings and the objective 
productivity measures is examined later in the paper. The submission of C.V.’s was 
strictly voluntary. Hence the measures are available for only 169 males and 115 female 
faculty for the full sample and 161 and 91 for the peer-review sample. Male faculty 
appear to publish slightly more refereed articles and books but the differences are not 
significant; female faculty earn more grant dollars and receive more service awards and 
these differences are statistically significant.  
 
Market Salary Factor, School and Rank: External Market Salary Factor  
Each individual was matched by rank and discipline (undifferentiated by gender) with 
national salary factors provided by the College and University Personnel Association or 
by other reputable national or regional associations such as the Association to Advance 
Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB) and the Society of American Law Teachers 
(SALT). This measure provides an alternative to the more traditional adoption of rank 
and discipline dummies.11  
The university in question is hiring from the market and if viewed as an atomistic 
player, takes market-determined wages as given. On the surface, it appears reasonable to 
treat the market salary factor as exogenous. The employer hires from different fields as 
needed, consistent with the market conditions for that field. Alternatively one could argue 
the variable may be tainted by endogeneity via two separate mechanisms. Individuals 
may sort themselves into fields, at least in part due to perceived or real discrimination 
within the field (and hence within the university). Second, if the university in question 
discriminates, perhaps unknowingly, in terms of promotion policy by gender then once 
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again treating the market salary factor as exogenous would be inappropriate, at least for 
ranks above assistant professor.  
 This issue constitutes an omitted variable problem. Any tendency to discriminate, 
intentional or unintentional, is unobserved and hence in the error term. Since it affects 
both earnings and rank, cov(rank, 𝜖) ≠ 0 and the regression suffers from endogeneity 
bias. If greater productivity leads to promotion and rank is positively associated with 
earnings, the bias will be upwards. This same set of issues occurs if, instead, rank and 
School dummy variables are included directly in the wage specification.12 In principle we 
would like to predict rank in order to help resolve the endogeneity problem. 
Unfortunately the data set includes no plausible instruments correlated with rank but 
unrelated to salary.13 Excluding external market salary (or similarly discipline and rank) 
from the regression specification would surely impart bias, and most likely an upward 
bias, to the coefficients on our productivity measures.  
 Evaluating the gender difference in average market salary within the current 
sample reveals a difference of slightly more than $11,000 per year, which is of a similar 
order of magnitude to the observed difference in actual salary, i.e. approximately $1000 
per month. Recall the former measure is undifferentiated by gender, implying that gender 
differences in field and rank are potentially important contributors to the gender wage 
differential. Similarly, academic rank also differs significantly by gender, with fewer 
female full-professors and a greater proportion of assistant professors. Several school 
dummy variables have been created by combining similar schools (to avoid small cell 
problems in some of the regressions). Consistent with the occupational crowding 
hypothesis [Bergmann (1974)] there are many significant gender differences in discipline 
 16 
structure noted in Table 1, in particular  for allied health, nursing and social work; 
engineering and science; and medical. 
 
Basic Human Capital and Standard Control Variables  
Holds doctorate and holds terminal degree (both in the field), are measures of academic 
qualification.  Fields requiring a doctorate as a minimum standard tend to pay higher 
wages due to restricted entry.  The same argument applies to the terminal degree variable 
for those fields where a lesser degree is recognized as the acceptable standard (terminal) 
for the discipline.  Table 1 shows that male faculty are significantly more likely to hold 
both doctorates and terminal degrees for their disciplines; this difference is expected to 
contribute to the explanation of observed gender wage differences. 
 Four time/longevity variables capture various aspects of work experience and 
tenure.  Years since highest degree obtained measures the number of years in the 
profession after completed training, whereas Age in years reflects general work 
experience.  Controlling for the former, a higher age implies more years of work or other 
experience prior to earning the degree. This in turn may be associated with higher or 
lower earnings depending upon whether prior general human capital is valued in 
academic settings. A later start may also imply a depreciation of research capability in 
some fields and/or act as a signal of lesser academic aptitude or commitment, on average. 
Males have significantly higher years since degree received suggesting a potential role 
for explaining salary differences.  Years since joining current university has an 
ambiguous expected effect.  To the extent that universities reward years of service, one 
would expect a positive relationship with earnings. However, if salaries are market-
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driven, longer service implies a greater distance from market premia and hence a negative 
effect on salary. Length of service at the university in question differs only by a year 
across gender and is not significant.  Leave of absence taken indicates whether formal 
time was taken out of the academic career.  Leaves for sabbatical and other professional 
reasons are not included in this category. The need to take formal leave may be an 
indicator of unusual family responsibilities or poor health; either could be associated with 
lower cumulative productivity on the job.14  Euwals and Ward [2005] document a 
significant negative effect of a similar measure for Scottish academics. In our sample 
almost twice as high a proportion of women as men take such leave. 
 Standard control variables include: Academic year appointment, i.e. 10 month 
versus 12 month, controls for otherwise unobservable differences in individual 
motivation, drive, salary-focus, or any tendency to discriminate in favor of males that 
may be correlated with academic year rather than year-round appointments. It also 
controls for bias due to the adjustment of annual salary to monthly salary across the two 
types of appointments. Significantly more males have year-round appointments 
suggesting this may play a role in explaining salary differences. Remote campus 
appointment controls for appointments either at a branch campus offering primarily the 
first two years of arts and science disciplines or at a remote site for the medical school. 
From Table 1 we see that approximately 3 percent of female faculty versus 9 percent of 
male faculty are located on a remote campus.  This differential is primarily attributable to 
the smaller proportion of women faculty in the medical school.   
 
4. Multivariate Models and Estimation Results 
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We estimate log-linear earnings regressions of the form:  
𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑖 = 𝐻𝑖′Γ+ Ci′Ψ +𝑀𝑖′Θ+ 𝑃𝑖′Δ+ 𝑂𝑖′Φ + 𝜖𝑖                                                                  (1) 
where H is a vector of control variables for human capital, C a vector of standard control 
variables, M an external market-salary (quadratic specification), with School and rank 
dummy variables as an alternate specification, P a vector of peer rating variables, and O a 
vector of objective measures of academic productivity; the Greek letters are conformable 
coefficient vectors. In the initial regression we restrict analysis to include only the human 
capital  and standard control variables on the right hand side; we subsequently add, in 
sequence, the peer productivity rating variables, the market salary factor (or School and 
rank dummy variables-see footnote 11), and the objective measures of productivity. 
Table 2 contains the results of three separate specifications of a semi-logarithmic 
earnings regression estimated over the peer review sample with a gender dummy variable 
as well as distinct male and female samples.15 We present the results only for the key 
variables.16   
 The first three rows provide results for the basic human capital specification 
[education and experience variables] with standard controls for the nature of the 
academic appointment; the second three rows add the peer review ratings and the final 
three rows add the quadratic specification of the market salary factor.17 When the market 
salary factor is added, the goodness- of-fit measure, R2, jumps substantially for the full 
sample and the gender subsamples.18 This suggests that the market salary factor has a 
strong influence on the salaries paid by the individual institution.   Both the linear and 
quadratic terms are statistically significant at the most conservative levels, suggesting an 
important positive (but declining) contribution of the market salary factor up to 
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approximately $107,000 for men and $92,000 for women.19  A lower turning point for 
the 
[Place Table 2 about here.] 
quadratic is consistent with the lower average salaries earned by women; women are less 
likely to enjoy a salary benefit from a rank20 and discipline with very high market 
salaries. The coefficient on the female dummy variable suggests a salary penalty in the 
basic specification of 8.5 percent but this is dampened to 4.7 (4.6) percent when the 
market salary factor is added, suggesting that women tend to be represented in fields with 
lower salaries, consistent with an occupational crowding [Bergmann (1974)] 
interpretation, and are at lower ranks. 
 In the basic specification, holding a doctorate appears to be productive for both 
men and women but the coefficient for women is about a third larger than for men. 
Although this does not change when the peer ratings are added (row 4), controlling for 
the market salary factor (School and rank) dampens both returns but the female 
coefficient is still significant and now nearly three times as large as the male coefficient.  
The peer review rating variables, Medium and High are both positive and  
significant overall and for men, and increasing as expected, (recall the default is low 
rating). However, the female estimated coefficients are, surprisingly, much smaller, less 
than one-fifth as large for the medium peer productivity rating and far from being 
significantly different from zero for the high rating.   
 When the market salary factor is added (rows 7 through 9) the peer rating effects 
for males are dampened but still significant and much higher than for females; this 
differential effect is largest for the high ratings. 
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The quadratic form in market salary factor itself has a strong, statistically 
significant effect across male and female samples.  The most surprising finding is the 
gender difference in the role of peer ratings,  i.e., coefficients for women are insignificant 
and dampened relative to men. We consider possible explanations for this robust but 
rather surprising finding in section 6. 
 In Table 3 counts of academic productivity are included in place of the peer 
productivity ratings, namely the number of refereed articles, and books, as well as 
measures of teaching and service awards and grant money. Results are for the sample of 
all faculty who submitted C.V.’s.  Because the sample is now quite small, the results on 
objective measures in Tables 3 and 4 are suggestive rather than definitive. The key 
influence of the market salary factor is maintained on this sub-sample and we again find 
significant effects for men but not for women.  
 The first three columns of table 3 report the results for the objective sample; 
columns 4 and 5 are for the smaller sample for whom we have both peer rating and 
objective measures. The female coefficient shows an earnings penalty of about 3.5  
[Insert Table 3 about here.] 
percent which is robust to the difference in sub-sample and to the addition of peer ratings. 
The latter effect is unsurprising given the small and insignificant effect of peer ratings on 
female earnings shown in Table 2. Once we control for objective measures the doctorate 
effect is dampened and becomes insignificant. The first two columns of Table 3 show 
that books and grant dollars have a significant positive effect overall and for the male 
sub-sample. But these effects are not significant for the admittedly smaller female sub-
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sample. We view this result as weakly supportive of the differential peer rating effect by 
gender. 
 Column 4 demonstrates that there are no important changes as we drop 
observations while moving to the smaller sample with both objective measures and peer 
ratings. Column 5 demonstrates that the returns to books and grant dollars for the 
combined male and female sample are robust to adding controls for peer ratings. 
Furthermore, the Medium coefficient is now smaller and insignificant. The distinction 
between low and medium peer review apparently makes little difference once these 
measures of objective productivity are included. Perhaps those perceived as low 
achievers have very low absolute counts so quality is an unimportant qualifier. The 
distinction between medium and high generates a smaller salary reward than seen in 
earlier tables but it is still a significant determinant. Subjective judgment apparently plays 
an important role in identifying quality dimensions which may separate high from 
medium performance. In column 6 a full set of gender interaction terms is provided for 
both the peer review ratings and the objective measures. Grant-making remains a 
significant determinant of salaries but books are no longer significant overall; female 
academics have a salary return to books that is significantly higher than male academics. 
The returns to a high rating are larger once we control for objective measures and are still 
significant. But the returns to a high rating for women are significantly lower than the 
returns to a high rating for male academics.  
 An alternative way of looking at the relationship between peer ratings and 
objective measures is to examine whether the objective measures determine the ratings. 
 22 
Table 4 reports the marginal effects from an ordered probit regression relating the peer 
rating category (Low, Medium, High) to the objective measures. Most coefficients are 
[Insert Table 4 about here.] 
insignificant including the female dummy variable; we find no ratings penalty for 
women. 
 Consider the first three columns. Books published is the only measure that 
significantly affects the distinction between low, medium, and high ratings. What we 
learn from the last three columns with interaction terms is that service awards become 
significant and positive (for high male ratings) but service awards increase the chances 
that women get medium or even low ratings. This exercise reinforces the finding from 
Table 3 that books are important—both for peer review ratings and for salaries; and that 
objective measures cannot fully predict ratings. Subjective judgment is needed to make 
difficult quality distinctions; that opens the door for potentially discriminatory 
distinctions as well. 
 
5. Discussion.  
In the literature review we mention Milgrom and Oster’s (1987) invisibility hypothesis, 
Valian’s (1998) notion of a gender schema, Bjerk’s (2008) dynamic version of a standard 
signaling game, and modern monopsony models as in Manning (2003) and Ashenfelter et 
al (2010). To what extent are the key empirical findings of the current analysis 
compatible with those theoretical models? Recall the key results are females earn less 
than men and objective productivity measures and peer review play a significant role in 
male but not female wage determination. In both the invisibility hypothesis and Bjerk’s 
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dynamic statistical discrimination model, academic employers have an incentive to delay 
or deny promotion of women in order to reap the benefits of their high productivity while 
in a low-paying job; such activity would dampen and obscure the positive association 
between productivity and salary.  This is consistent with the empirically observed over-
representation of women in the lecturer ranks and consequent lower female wage. This 
same conclusion applies with equal force to the monopsony power story in that males 
may find it easier to gain outside offers and receive counter offers from their home 
institution, leading to higher wages and earlier promotion.  Gender schemas could also 
lead to a reduction in female promotion due to misperceptions of productivity.21   
 To a large extent the competing theoretical explanations are observationally 
equivalent in the current context. One potentially important feature of the Bjerk model is 
that males are more accomplished at discerning male (compared to female) potential 
productivity. The gender schema on the other hand suggests that both males and females 
may suffer the same distortion. Table 4 illustrates the link between peer productivity and 
objective measures of academic productivity. Those results suggest that gender is not a 
significant determinant of the relationship. Table 5 sheds some additional light. Gender 
schemas may distort both male and female perceptions. We examine whether males are 
more likely to misperceive the productivity of female faculty members.22 If so, we would 
expect to observe the effect in male-dominated schools but not at all, or at least to a lesser 
extent, in those schools with strong female representation. In the former schools, female 
faculty would be mostly rated by males but that would not be true in the latter. Consider 
regressions on two subsamples of the data which are reported in Table 5.  
[Insert Table 5 about here.] 
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 The first set of results, designated male-dominated, are for schools where 20 
percent or fewer of the faculty are female (business, dental, engineering and technology, 
law, medical, science); the second set, designated, female-represented, are for schools 
where 38 to 52 percent of the faculty are female (art, education, journalism, liberal arts, 
physical education, public affairs, social work).23 Women are likely to have their salaries 
set and their productivity peer reviewed predominantly by males in the male dominated 
schools; that is less likely in the female represented schools. A similar pattern prevails 
with dampened and insignificant female peer review coefficients in both male-dominated 
and female-represented samples. The difference between male and female coefficients is 
particularly high for the High peer review dummy. This exercise provides little support 
for the notion that the peer rating effect is due primarily to misperceptions of male 
faculty.  
To further explore the role of gender schemas we examine the pattern of cohort 
effects. Table 6 presents the results from introducing three cohort dummy variables with 
cohort 1 (0-10 years from terminal degree); cohort 2 (11-20 years from terminal degree); 
and cohort 3 (more than 20 years from terminal degree). The Table presents the results of  
[Place Table 6 about here.] 
including these cohort variables in the peer review sample along with the peer rating 
variables and the interactions with cohort.  
 There are no significant cohort effects for men; no interaction terms are 
significant. The story is different for women. For cohort 1 earning their terminal degrees 
after 1987, the peer review ratings earn a reasonable salary return although more so for 
the distinction between medium and low than between medium and high—so there is still 
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an issue in rewarding high-achieving women. The cohort 2 interactions show that the 
peer review ratings work very poorly for the women who earned their terminal degrees 
between 1977 and 1987 when large numbers of women were entering the academy. 
Finally the cohort 3 interactions show no significant difference in the salary reward to 
productivity for women in the oldest and newest cohorts. This fits a gender schema story 
in the following way. Women who earned their terminal degrees prior to 1977 before the 
academy was very open to women essentially made it or not on existing standards ands 
judgements. There were comparatively few women. They accepted this challenge and 
either made it or not as did men. Hence productivity ratings were fairly accurate 
reflections of productivity as defined by the university hierarchy which was largely made 
up of males. Large numbers of women entered in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s and it 
was more difficult for salary reward systems managed mostly by men of earlier 
generations to accurately evaluate the productivity of these women. A decade later more 
of these systems were managed by men of a younger generation, and some women, and 
those of the older generation had at least more experience evaluating women. Hence 
salaries start again to line up more closely with peer rated productivity. This gives more 
credence to the gender schemas explanation but also suggests that its effect may be 
fading somewhat in importance as time goes on and women populate the academy in 
larger numbers. 
Combining Bjerk’s model of statistical discrimination with a gender schemas 
argument provides potentially the best explanation of our findings. Adapting Bjerk’s 
model to the academic labor market, women are less likely to be hired into tenure track 
jobs, even if as skilled as men, and must provide more signals of productivity to get 
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promoted, if their skill signals are less precise. For example they might have to publish 
more co-authored articles than a male colleague if supervisors tended to view women as 
possibly taking subordinate roles in multiple author projects. The gender schemas 
argument can be coupled with this to provide a reason why the signals might be less 
precise. If the same signal is emitted by male and female academics, supervisors judge 
the male (female) signal more (less) favorably based on preconceptions. In Bjerk’s 
model, employers eventually learn to accurately interpret the skill signals of women. But 
the initial disadvantage has a long-term effect. Bjerk shows that even if later promotion is 
nondiscriminatory, women would be less likely to make it to the top rank and hence 
would have lower salaries than men and a lower correlation between productivity and 
salary. As time passes, gender schemas become less prevalent in evaluating women’s 
skill signals and productivity and salary are better aligned. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 Our study’s main contribution concerns a subjective measure of academic 
productivity but it also contributes to the literature concerned with the salary effects of 
objective measures of academic productivity. Most of the earlier studies reported in Table 
1 cover only a subset of academic productivity measures like articles and books or 
articles, grants and teaching; none consider service. We are able to simultaneously 
control for a broader set of measures, including articles, books, external grants, teaching 
and service awards. In our study covering a wide variety of disciplines only books and 
grant dollars are significant determinants of earnings. It appears that overall faculty 
receive an earnings boost from an extra book but the earnings premium for women is 
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significantly below that for men. Consistent with earlier findings, grant dollars are 
significant overall and for men; the point estimate for women is similar but not 
significant. Teaching awards are weakly significant for males. Service awards do not 
contribute directly to earnings but are a significant factor in men but not women 
obtaining a higher peer review rating. 
Our results also suggest a pivotal role for the market salary factor by discipline 
and rank. When included it is a highly significant determinant of salary and equally so for 
both women and men. Nonetheless the endogeneity difficulty [due to rank and 
disciplinary/School crowding] makes the interpretation challenging. If we take the 
particular university in question as an atomistic competitor, there is not much it can do, 
by itself, to address gender salary differentials ingrained in the market. But if individual 
universities fail to assess whether market-based salary differentials are consistent with 
underlying productivity at the local university level, faculty salaries will be misaligned. 
Most importantly, the econometric results demonstrate that academic 
productivity, assessed subjectively by peers, contributes significantly to male but not 
female earnings. The comparative lack of reward for peer-rated female productivity is 
striking. Combining Bjerk’s dynamic statistical discrimination model with gender 
schemas provides a potential explanation for our results. Our cohort analysis seems 
consistent with a gender schemas/statistical discrimination story but also suggests that the 
puzzling disconnect between productivity measures and salaries for women may have 
been at its peak for women who earned their terminal degrees in the late 1970’s and early 
1980’s with the disconnect less substantial in the decade following. Whether the 
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connection between female academic perceived productivity and earnings is continuing 
to strengthen is a puzzle for future research with more recent data to resolve.  
The cohort effects found here point to the importance of empirical work on 
academic wage structure using current data. Future work on the theoretical side should 
address dynamic aspects of discrimination as early salary and promotion decisions cast 
long shadows. Future work on the empirical side should attempt to devise tight tests of 
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Notes
                                                 
1 Recent examples of studies which focus on other possible explanations of the academic 
gender wage gap include Toumanoff [2005],on  initial salary negotiations, and Hilmer 
and Hilmer [2010], on job mobility patterns. 
 
2 Interestingly Blackaby et al point to males receiving more outside offers as a key culprit 
in unequal salaries in the UK. But this may not be as important in other countries. The 
UK market for economists, in particular, has experienced churning due to the Research 
Assessment Exercise; departments wish to attract and/or retain the most productive 
researchers in the period leading up to the next assessment exercise.  Apparently more 
males test the market and receive offers. Our data include no information on outside 
offers but we do have information on the relevant market salary across rank and 
discipline. 
 
3 In two disciplines the relevant salary survey was at the regional level rather than 
national.  
 
4 The process is described in detail in Carlin and Rooney [2000]. 
 
 
5 At the university in question, appointments are considered either ten-month (for the 
academic year) or twelve-month for the calendar year.  We therefore divide by 10 or 12, 
as appropriate, to arrive at a comparable monthly salary for all faculty.  In some other 
universities, an academic year appointment would be counted as nine months.  Dividing 
by ten may be viewed as imparting a small downward bias to the salaries of academic 
year appointees; 66% of female faculty are academic year appointees while only 53% of 
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male faculty are academic year appointees. We include an academic year appointment 
dummy variable to control for this potential downward bias. 
 
6 There is an added legal reason for making the effort. At least one court has found in 
favor of the plaintiffs in a reverse discrimination suit, citing among other things, a failure 
to control for productivity (U.S. Court of Appeals [1995]). 
 
7 In most cases these were senior faculty members who had neither served as Chair nor on 
a Salary Committee; in one discipline the Chair was allowed to be a reviewer because in 
that discipline an independent salary committee determined salary increments. 
 
8 The ordinary salary review process is quite standard for the US academic market. The 
largest internal salary adjustments are for promotion which is based upon peer review. 
The process for assigning individual annual salary increments varies widely both across 
schools and within schools across departments. The role of peer review in these 
assignments varies from dominant to minimal. 
 
9 Because of concerns about the confidentiality of the ratings, the forms were destroyed 
after the ratings were entered in the database. 
 
10  Based upon reports from a small set of department chairs on the method of review 
wihin their department. 
 
11 A comparison of the empirical results associated with the two approaches to rank and 
discipline is provided in section 5.  
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12  We used this alternate specification as a robustness check. Key results are highly robust 
to this alternate specification. Results are available from authors. 
 
13  Attempts to estimate rank on the pooled sample of female and male faculty by an 
ordered probit, relying on the nonlinearity of the specification for identification proved 
unsatisfactory. Results are available from the authors. 
 
14 A leave of absence could still have a positive effect on productivity and salary if the 
time allocated to care-giving is less than the time allocated to teaching and service related 
functions and the individual on leave continues to build their publication  record. Some 
non-sabbatical leaves may also be for a visit to another institution where productivity 
may be enhanced or unchanged. 
 
15 The results for the full sample are quite similar; the estimated coefficients are quite 
robust to the exclusion of observations from units that chose not to participate in peer 
review. 
 
16  A complete set of results with all of the independent variables for the full sample, as 




17 Rotating the standard presentation for the table by 90 degrees allows us to present nine 
columns of results without resorting to a ‘landscape’ orientation for the page. 
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18 If School and rank variables are added in place of the market salary factor  variables, 
we observe similar increases. In all of the results reported here and in subsequent tables, 
key results are highly robust to a substitution of rank and School dummy  variables for 
the market salary factor variables.It is also interesting to note that the R-squared values 
are consistently higher for the female than the male sample in this and all other reported 
results. 
 
19 For the regression analysis the linear term for salary factor is divided by 10,000 and the 
quadratic term is divided by 1,000,000. 
 
20  In all of the specifications reported, lecturers are included as well as tenure stream 
faculty. As a test of robustness we removed the lecturers from the sample. All of the main 
results are highly robust to the removal of the lecturers. 
 
21 Promotion can be delayed by tenure clock stoppages, movements out of and back into 
academia, and by moving between universities prior to the award of tenure. 
 
22 The effect is also not simply due to a higher variance of the peer review ratings for 
women. In fact the standard deviations for low, medium, and highare the same for women 
and men to two decimal places. 
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Table 1.  Variable means for regular faculty sample, all variables.  
 Female Sample Male Sample T-statistic for  
Dependent Variable Mean Mean Difference in Means
  




Peer Productivity Review Scores   
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Low productivity 0.140 0.139 -0.05 
 
Medium productivity 0.435 0.388 -1.13  
 
High productivity 0.425 0.474 1.15 
 
Objective Measures of Productivity 
Books 0.565 0.858 1.01 
 
Log of grant dollars 7.018 5.456 -2.15** 
 
Refereed publications 5.452 5.799 0.266 
 
Service Award 1.330 0.793 -1.85* 
 
Teaching award 1.452 1.260 -0.70 
 
Market Salary Factor 
Average academic year salary 48,547.21 60,072.3 9.38***  
 (for given discipline and rank)  
 
Rank 
Lecturer  0.105 0.035 -4.13*** 
 
Assistant Professor 0.336 0.207 -4.09***   
 
Associate Professor 0.404 0.385 -0.54  
 
Professor + 0.155 0.373 6.64***  
 
Schools 
Allied health, nursing, 
 social work 0.394 0.042 -14.84***  
 
Business, journalism, law, 
 public affairs 0.087 0.122 1.54  
 
Dental 0.061 0.118 2.61***  
 
Education, physical education 0.072 0.040 -2.01**  
 
 




Table 1 (continued) 
 Female Sample Male Sample T-statistic for  
Independent Variables Mean Mean Difference in Means  
 
Liberal arts, fine arts, continuing 
 studies, library science 0.253 0.199 -1.80*  
 
Medical 0.058 0.19 5.28***  
 
Human Capital 
Holds doctorate in field  0.704 0.895 7.22***  
 
Holds terminal degree in field 0.834 0.956 6.18***  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Age in years  48.657 48.664 0.01  
 
Leave of absence  0.147 0.082 -2.13** 
   
Years since highest  15.329 20.040 6.88***  
 degree obtained 
 
Years at current university 13.835 14.694 1.26 
 
Control Variables 
Academic year appointment 0.657 0.538 -3.30***  
 
Remote campus appointment  0.032 0.094 3.23***  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Sample size (full sample) 277 574  
 
Productivity rating sub-sample 207 418 
 
Objective measures sub-sample 115 169 
Variable names in bold have results reported in one or more of the estimation tables.  





Table 2: Earnings regression—(i) human capital and basic controls; (ii) plus peer 
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   .48 625 
(2) Male 
Only 
  .202*** 
 (.042) 




  .268*** 
 (.039) 


























































































 (heteroskedastic standard errors in parentheses)  
Each specification includes a constant, the human capital and control variables (academic year appointment, 
remote appointment, holds doctorate, holds terminal degree, age and its square, leave of absence, years since 
highest degree obtained and its square, years with current university); variations in other tables will be noted. 
Full set of results including rank and  school group dummy variables is available from authors. 













Table 3: Earnings regression—Effect of objective measures—Objective 
measures subsample; dependent variable = log (monthly salary) 
Sample--gender     (1) 
    All      
     (2) 
   Male 
      (3) 
  Female 
     (4) 
     All 
   (5) 
   All 
    (6) 
   All 
Explanatory 
Variable 
                    
Female  -.036** 
 (.017) 




  .073 
 (.055) 
Holds Doctorate   .034 
 (.053) 
   .047 
  (.035) 
    .023 
   (.101)         
  .051 
 (.051) 
  .054 
 (.055) 
  .038 
 (.043) 
Objective measures     




    .099** 
   (.046) 
    .061 
  (.074) 
.097*** 
 (.036) 
  .077** 
 (.036) 
  .048 
 (.043) 
Log (grant dollars ÷ 
100,000) 
  .036** 
 (.16) 
    .045** 
    (.019) 
    .044 
   (.027) 
.040** 
 (.016) 
  .039** 
 (.016) 
  .042** 
 (.019) 
Refereed articles (÷ 
10) 
  .010 
 (.010) 
    .013 
    (.013) 
    .011 
   (.016) 
.013 
 (.011) 
  .013 
 (.010) 
  .016 
 (.011) 




     .002 
    (.045) 
   -.057 
   (.064) 
.009 
 (.048) 
  .001 
 (.049) 
  .007 
 (.005) 




     .064* 
    (.038) 
   -.058 
   (.083) 
.055 
 (.040) 
  .049 
 (.041) 
  .068 
 (.044) 
Peer Ratings   
Medium       .029 
 (.025) 
  .025 
 (.031) 
High       .070*** 
 (.025) 





Avg. academic year 
salary (÷10,000) 
  .322*** 
 (.046)   
   .376*** 
  (.053) 
    .410*** 
   (.073) 
 .353*** 
(.046) 
  .376*** 
 (.047) 
  .374*** 
 (.046) 
Avg. academic year 




  -.178*** 
  (.045) 
   -.271*** 










Fem*Medium       -.017 
 (.057) 
Fem*High       -.138** 
 (.061) 




       -.007 
 (.036) 
Fem* Refereed 
articles (÷ 10) 
      -.033 
 (.021) 
Fem* Service awards 
(÷ 10) 




awards (÷ 10) 
       -.007 
 (.088) 
F-tests on interaction 
terms in column 6 
The test that the coefficients of female plus fem*High equals zero was 
rejected at p=.018 (F=5.7);  
the test that the coefficients of female plus fem*Medium equals zero 
was not rejected at conventional levels (p=.11).  
None of the similar tests on the female/objective measure interactions 
were rejected at conventional levels. 
R2   .784     .776     .805   .796   .803   .816 
N    284       169      115   251    251    251 
(heteroskedastic standard errors in parentheses)  
Each specification includesa constant and the basic controls and human capital variables. 
The sample for the first three columns is the set of faculty who submitted c.v.’s. The last two columns is for 
the set of faculty who both submitted c.v’s and had peer review ratings submitted by their department. 
Results on key variables  for the first three columns are essentially the same whether the sample of 284 or 
251 is employed. (Results are available from authors.) 
A specification with a full set of gender/objective measures interaction terms was estimated but none of the 
interaction terms were significant at conventional levels and results for key variables were highly robust to 
their inclusion. (Results available from authors.) 





Table 4: Determinants of peer productivity ratings.  
 
                    Ordered Probit 
[marginal effects= change in probability of  being in cell, z-statistic in parentheses.] 











     (3) 
Dependent 
variable: 
Peer Rating  
= High    






       (5) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Peer Rating = 
Medium 
     (6) 
Dependent 
variable: 
Peer Rating  
= High    
Explanatory Variable          No interaction terms         Interaction terms included 
Female    -0.002 
   (-0.13) 
   -0.008 
   (-0.13) 
    0.010 
   (0.13) 
 -0.028 
 (-1.33) 
    -0.119 
   (-1.31) 
    0.146 
    (1.33) 
Objective Measures       
Books (÷ 10)    -0.233*** 
   (-2.65) 
   -0.789** 
   (-2.51) 
     1.022** 
    (2.66) 
 -0.206** 
 (-2.36) 
    -0.822** 
   (-2.36) 
    1.028** 
    (2.46) 
Log [grant dollars  
(÷100,000)] 
   -0.004 
   (-0.28) 
   -0.013 
   (-0.28) 
     0.016 
    (0.28) 
 -0.012 
 (-0.86) 
    -0.048 
   (-0.88) 
    0.061 
    (0.88) 
Refereed articles (÷10)    -0.002 
   (-0.25) 
   -0.007 
   (-0.25) 
     0.009 
    (0.25) 
 -0.006 
 (-0.68) 
    -0.023 
   (-0.68) 
    0.029 
    (0.69) 
Service Awards 
(÷10) 
   -0.067 
   (-1.30) 
   -0.228 
   (-1.35) 
     0.295 
    (1.36) 
 -0.125* 
 (-1.73) 
   -0.496* 
   (-1.81) 
    0.621* 
    (1.84) 
Teaching Awards 
(÷10) 
   -0.020 
   (-0.57) 
   -0.069 
   (-0.57) 
    0.089 
    (0.58) 
   0.007 
  (0.19) 
    -0.027 
    (0.19) 
   -0.034 
   (-0.19) 
Female/Objective 
Measure Interactions 
      
Fem*books  
(÷10) 
     
 




   -0.491 
   (-0.49) 
     0.614 
    (0.50) 
Fem*[log_grant 
dollars] (÷100,000) 
    
 
    0.027 
  (1.01) 
    0.108 
    (1.04) 
    -0.135 
   (-1.04) 
Fem*refereed articles 
(÷10) 
   
 
    
 
  0.027 
 (1.46) 
    0.106 
    (1.50) 
    -0.133 
    (-1.52) 
Fem*Service Awards 
(÷10) 
     
 
     
 
   
 
  0.201* 
  (1.79) 
    0.801* 
   (1.88) 
    -1.002* 
    (-1.91) 
Fem*Teaching Awards 
(÷10) 
    
 
    
 
  -0.086 
 (-1.20) 
   -0.342 
   (-1.25) 
    0.428 
    (1.25) 
Log-likelihood                        -228.74                         -179.21 
N                          251                            251 
The sample consists of the individuals for whom we have both predicted rank and a C.V. The specification also included a 
constant and the human capital and control variables (academic year appointment, remote appointment, holds doctorate, 
holds terminal degree, age and its square, leave of absence, years since highest degree obtained and its square, years with 
current university)., market salary factor 





Table 5: Earnings regression-peer ratings; male-dominated and female-
represented schools--peer rating subsample; dependent variable = log (monthly 
salary) 
 Male Dominated Female Represented 
Explanatory 
Variable 
  Male Female Male Female 
Holds doctorate  -.067 
 (.042) 
  .057 
 (.100) 
   .068** 
  (.033) 
  .028 
 (.053) 
Peer Ratings     
Medium   .055 
 (.034) 
  .066 
 (.064) 
  .044 
 (.043) 
  .032 
 (.037) 
High   .116*** 
 (.035) 
  .016 
 (.071) 
  .077* 
 (.045) 




    
Average academic 
year salary  (÷ 
10,000) 
  .248*** 
 (.048) 
  .240*** 
 (.076) 
  .428*** 
 (.090) 






  -.103*** 
  (.028) 






R2    .702   .866   .833   .851 
N     269      53    140    100 
(heteroskedastic standard errors in parentheses)  
The specification also included a constant and the human capital and control variables 
(academic year appointment, remote appointment, holds doctorate, holds terminal 
degree, age and its square, leave of absence, years since highest degree obtained and 
its square, years with current university). 




Table 6: Earnings regression-peer rating cohort effects--peer rating subsample; 
dependent variable = log (monthly salary). 
Sample- gender         All      Male    Female 
Explanatory Variable    
Female 
 
  -.051*** 
  (.014) 
  
Holds Doctorate    .059** 
  (.027) 
   .029 
  (.037) 
   .117*** 
  (.039) 
Peer Ratings    
Medium 
 
  .076 
 (.050) 
   .057 
  (1.15) 
   .116** 
   (.048) 
High   .108** 
 (.051) 
   .114 
  (.116) 
   .102** 
  (.047) 
Cohort    
Cohort 2 (11 – 20 years)   .176*** 
 (.061) 
   .143 
  (.034) 
   .228*** 
  (.060) 
Cohort 3 (> 20 years)   .051 
 (.055) 
   .049 
  (.123) 
   .113* 
  (.058) 
Ratings/cohort interactions    
Medium*cohort2   -.146** 
  (.064) 
   -.126 
   (.133) 
   -.178*** 
   (.068) 
High*cohort2   -.144** 
  (.064) 
   -.107 
   (.135) 
   -.214*** 
  (.069) 
Medium*cohort 3    .028 
  (.057) 
    .037 
   (.119) 
   -.028 
   (.065) 
High* cohort3    .037 
  (.057) 
   .031 
  (.120) 
    .010 
   (.069) 
Market Salary Factor    
Average academic year salary  
(÷ 10,000) 
   .303*** 
  (.024) 
   .312*** 
  (.029) 
    .304*** 
   (.041) 
Average academic yearsalary 
squared(÷ 1,000,000)  
   -.146*** 
   (.019) 
  -.146*** 
  (.023) 
  -.171*** 
 ( .033) 
R2     .729     .693    .736 
N      625      418     207 
(heteroskedastic standard errors in parentheses)  
The specification also included a constant and the human capital and control 
variables (academic year appointment, remote appointment, holds doctorate, holds 
terminal degree, age and its square, leave of absence, years since highest degree 
obtained and its square, years with current university). 
*, **, ***  indicates a significant coefficient at the.10,  .05, or .01  level respectively. 
 
 
